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This paper appraises the likely effects of the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the East African Community (EAC) and the
European Union (EU). Customs data are used to estimate the revenue and welfare effects of an EPA with and without an exception list. Revenue
and welfare effects are rather small. The paper then discusses the beneﬁts that would have occurred had the EAC-EU protocol on rules of origin
been simpliﬁed and made more compatible with the multilateral trading system. An inclusion of services would have also helped achieve the
objective of increased competitiveness in goods trade, while the time table for tariff reduction in the EAC should have been shorter. The paper
suggests in closing that the present appraisal is applicable also to the other African EPAs.
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(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).JEL classification: F1; F4; O5
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At the concluding days of the Doha negotiations in November
2001, WTO members signed a waiver extending the Cotonou
Partnership Agreement (CPA) which allowed the Cotonou trade
regime to be extended provided that it became WTO-compatible,
that is a reciprocal Free Trade Area (FTA). Negotiations were to be
concluded byDecember 2007. Successful negotiations between the
EU and 15 CARIFORUM countries of the Caribbean resulted in an
agreement (the CA-EU EPA) that included reduction on barriers to
trade in services as well as trade in goods. This “deep” agreement
reflected a favorable balance in the trade-off between the benefits
(internalizing the spillovers) and the costs (moving away fromr draws on de Melo and Regolo (2013). This paper benefited
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fll righmembers' preferred national policies) of a deep regional agreement
as it resulted in the delegation of national sovereignty to negotiation
teams at the regional level. Yet, after five years into the agreement,
only six members had ratified it and only two had started tariff
reductions. Difficulties in satisfying the necessary regulatory and
policy changes, a lack of funding and a lack of technical support
have been mentioned as reasons for the delays (South Centre,
2013). Further delays resulted from the EU's request that the
Mutual Recognition Agreements necessary for integrating services
markets be carried out first at the CARIFORUM level.
This positive balance during the negotiation phase was absent
for the other negotiating groups, especially in Africa where
disparities among members in each negotiation group (large
and small countries, landlocked and coastal, resource-rich and
resource-poor, ethno-linguistic fractionalization) were greater
than for the CA-EU negotiations, disparities that effectively
blocked negotiations that could have led to a “deep” EPA as in the
case of CARIFORUM. In the end, these negotiations settled in
December 2007 for a series of Interim Agreements (IEPAs) that
still preserved Duty-Free Quota-Free (DFQF) access to the EU for
35ACP countries. For non-LDCACP countries, this amounted tots reserved. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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countries have negative preferential margins at the product level
because of EU preferences granted to competitors. Probably the
most significant market access obtained from the negotiations
was the relaxation of some rules of origin (RoO) requirements.1
Five years later, with the October 1, 2014 deadline for
concluding “full” EPAs, non-LDC partners in those groupings
that would not have reached an agreement would return to GSP
status. This paper draws on the experience of the EAC, the
African negotiation group that has gone furthest in integrating
along the lines outlined in the CPA (see below) since it is a now a
common market, a level beyond the common market envisaged
by the EUwhen the CPA was launched. It gives evidence that the
EAC-EU EPA will only result in a very marginal reduction in
trade barriers by African partners and no extra access in the EU
market since negotiations are only for goods trade and most
members already have DFQF access.
Section 2 provides the background on the CPA and on the
interim EPAs. The remainder of the paper turns to the EAC-EU
EPA. Section 3 reports ‘traditional’ estimates of revenue losses
based on statutory revenues and Section 4 gives more accurate
estimates based on customs data for Rwanda and Uganda.
These results suggest very small benefits from the final EPA
even though the EAC is the only negotiation group that
satisfied the ‘two-layer objective’ of the EU at the launch of the
negotiations under the aegis of the CPA. Section 5 discusses
some of the omitted elements in the agenda which would have
led to larger gains for the EAC. Section 6 concludes.2. The CPA rationale
The CPA sets out the following four core elements around
which to build the EPAs:1. Differentiation: Keep differential and special treatment
(SDT) taking into account the level of development using
asymmetry to benefit especially vulnerable, landlocked and
small island economies;
2. Reciprocity: ensuring WTO-compatibility represents a radi-
cal departure from previous EU-ACP relations whose ratio-
nale is to liberalize ACP markets, foster competition, better
resource allocation and enhanced investment, both foreign
and domestic;
3. Regionalism (two-layer objective): only in exceptional cir-
cumstances would negotiations be envisaged with individual
countries, the conviction being that regional integration for
ACP countries is the stepping stone towards a successful
integration in the World Trading System;1 WTO (2011, p. 128) estimates that adjusted preferential margins for African
countries are about 1 percentage point. Rules of origin were relaxed for ﬁsheries
and for textiles and apparel as the EU followed suit on AGOA and adopted the
single transformation rule (see de Melo and Portugal-Perez, 2014). Arguably,
this was the most signiﬁcant market access achievements for LDCs resulting
from the IEPAs.4. Development: EPAs are to be “economically meaningful,
politically sustainable, and socially acceptable”.
The CPA objectives are laudable. It is likely that the absence of
reciprocity in past EU-ACP relations contributed to their lack of
integration into worldmarkets. Even though difficult to implement,
pushing for regional integration within heterogeneous groupings
would lead to larger gains than if the groupings were more
homogenous (de Melo and Tsikata, 2014). The development
component deserves no comment. Finally, keeping SDT would
have required that the EU does not extend preferences to other
countries.
Apart from South Africa, which continues to export under its
own free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU (the Trade,
Development and Cooperation Agreement (TDCA)), the
remaining African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in
the final stages of negotiating a ‘full’ EPA now export to the
European market under one of the following regimes (listed in
terms of increasing preferential access):
• the EU Generalized System of Preferences (GSP);
• the GSP+ sub-regime2;
• Everything But Arms (EBA) sub-regime in the case of LDCs
which gives duty-free quota-free (DFQF) access to the EU;
Except for CA-EU EPA initialed in 2007, all other IEPA
negotiations concentrated on Trade-in-Goods issues with much
negotiating energy going to draw the exclusion list so as to reach
the 80% tariff-free imports from the EU along with the
corresponding timetable to reach that objective. In the end, the
IEPAs did not result in the negotiation of a “full” reciprocal FTA
since only 80% of imports from the EU were to have tariffs
eventually set to zero. It is therefore interesting to have an idea of
what has been negotiated as opposed to a full reciprocal FTAwith
all tariffs on EU imports set to zero and whatmight have happened
under a deep agreement including barriers to trade in services.
As expected, a large number of LDCs (26 out of 50) that had
duty-free-quota-free (DFQF) market access under the EBA
initiative since 2002, have opted not to enter into an EPA agreement
reflecting their desire to keep the status quo and therefore not to
take up this possibility to liberalize domestic trade bilaterally even
though it is politically more appealing than integrating on a
unilateral or multilateral basis. In the end, it is the countries that
were relatively advanced in their own regional integration with a
non-LDC partner (i.e. the EAC and SACU) that opted to enter
IEPAs, an indication that these countries value their regional
integration efforts and potentially, are more reform-minded.
Table 1 summarizes what was negotiated under the IEPAs in
2007, and the phasing in of tariff reductions among ACP
signatories. An inspection of columns 1–3 reveals a great2 The GSP arrangement and its sub-regimes exclude those among the non-
LDCs who are negotiating the follow-up to the current interim European
Partnership Agreements. The GSP+ is a speciﬁc incentive arrangement which
offers deep tariff cuts for vulnerable countries that ratiﬁed and implemented
international conventions relating to human and labor rights, the environment
and good governance. It concerns additional tariff reductions for essentially the
same 66% tariff lines as for the standard GSP arrangement.
17J. de Melo, J. Regolo / Journal of African Trade 1 (2014) 15–24diversity in the outcome of the different negotiation groups with
respect to timing, the speed of tariff reduction, and products
excluded from liberalization. At one extreme, Mozambique and
Côte d'Ivoire start to liberalize immediately in 2008 with most
liberalization up-front, the ‘cold-shower’ approach. At the other
extreme, EAC does not start reducing tariffs on EU imports before
2014, with tariff reductions taking place over 19 years ending in
2033. These large differences in the timing of liberalization across
groupings probably reflect a combination of several factors: the
relative negotiating power/knowledge across negotiating teams;
last minute haste on both sides; different development agendas
across countries. Perhaps the most important determining factor
was the relative weakness of the public sector in the face of the
private sector whose interests are to maintain a status quo.Table 1
The phasing of tariff elimination and product exclusion in the IEPAs.
Source: Carrère and de Melo (2008).
Members
(1)
Phase 1
(2)
Phase 2
(3)
Phase 3
(4)
Exclusions
(5)
Cameroon 2010–13 2011–17 2014–23 1217
(24.5%) (24.3%) (30.2%) (21%)
Côte d'Ivoire 2008–12 2013–17 2018–22 517
(59.5%) (10.6%) (9.9%) (20%)
Ghana 2009–13 2013–17 2018–22 1085
(28.8%) (42.6%) (8.3%) (20.3%)
EACa 2010–14 2015–23 2020–33 1323
Burundi (29.7%) (28.1%) (23%)
Kenya (18.3%) (4.2%) (19.4%)
Rwanda (18.6%) (3.2%) (25.4%)
Tanzania (17.6%) (2.4%) (20.2%)
Uganda (20.4%) (2.5%) (17.3%)
EAS
Comoros 2013 2014–22 2014–22 93
(21.5%) (25%) (34%) (19.3%)
Madagascar 2013 2014–22 2014–22 575
(37.0) (26.1%) (17.6%) (19.3%)
Mauritius 2008 2013–17 2013–22 185
(24.5%) (29.1%) (42%) (4.4%)
Seychelles 2013 2013–17 2013–22 131
(62.1%) (15.1%) (20.4%) (2.5%)
Zimbabwe 2013 2015–23 2015–22 716
(44.9%) (14.7%) (20.3%) (20.1%)
SACU 2008 2008–12 2011–14 181
(55%) (12.4%) (0.8%) (16.7%)
Mozambique 2008 2018
50.8% (2.6%) (37.8%)
Notes: Phases refer to those agreed at the signing of the IEPA in 2007. In all
cases: average value of imports over 2004–06. Since many agreements have not
been ratified, it would be more accurate to state the number of years per phase
rather than the actual years. For example for the EAC, if the agreement is signed
in 2014, phase I would cover 2014–2018, phase II would cover 2019–2027,
etc.
Columns: Columns (2) to (4) give the length of each phase with the percentage
of EU imports moving to zero tariffs in parenthesis. In some cases, there is
overlap in the phases indicating that some tariffs in a previous phase are still
being reduced while new tariff reductions have started in the next phase.
Column (5) gives the number of excluded tariff lines counted at HS-6 level
followed by the percentage of imports from the EU in parenthesis. So for
Cameroon, tariff elimination is over 13 years with phase I taking place during
the period 2010–13 and involving 24.5% of imports from the EU. There are
1217 excluded tariffs lines at the (HS6 level) which count for 21% of imports
from the EU (over 2004–2006).
a All EAC countries have identical schedules.In any event, these negotiated schedules lacked credibility.
Usually, tariff-reduction negotiations for all barriers to trade
(tariffs and NTBs) in Free Trade Area (FTA) negotiations are
spread over a less-than 10 year period (NAFTA, MERCOSUR,
various enlargements of the EU). Here reductions are typically
spread over twice as long a period while at the same time
excluding a good chunk of bilateral trade. Common sense suggests
that it is highly probable that these schedules will be interpreted as
‘the indefinite future’ and be subject to renegotiation as has just
occurred for the recently signed ECOWAS-EU EPA.
At the time of writing in August 2014, an ECOWAS-EU
EPA was signed on July 14, and on July 15, it was announced
that a SADC-EU EPA was reaching signature stage. In the case
of the ECOWAS-EU EPA very little reduction in trade barriers
was finally negotiated.3 This is also the case for the SADC-EU
EPA where the main benefit for 28 SADC members is the
preservation of preferential access (beyond GSP) for fish, beef
and sugar exports to the EU from Botswana, Namibia and
Swaziland.
For the EAC, the full EPA includes three phases.4 The first
one is the full implementation of the EAC's CET which
includes tariff liberalization for around 50% of EU imports in
2011. Even though the exception list to the CET (the so-called
“Sensitive Item” (SI) list of products) is likely to be extended,
the 5 EAC countries are full members of the EAC customs
Union since 2010. Should this SI list grow, insofar as new
goods are not on the extended list, the EPA will exclude
products originating from the EU. The second phase includes
the liberalization of some goods starting seven years after the
signature of the agreement and the third one should start twelve
years after the ratification. In short, if the agreement is signed as
expected in 2014, the liberalization of 80% of imports from the
European Union (among which 50% are already traded at zero
tariffs) would start in 2020 and would end only in 2038. This is
an extraordinarily long period that could only be justified if the
fears of an invasion of imports from the EU are plausible. The
next two sections show that this is most unlikely.3 Nigeria opposed the agreement in the ﬁnal stages, insisting until early July on
renegotiating key provisions including requiring that 181 tariff lines be reclassiﬁed
within different categories of the offer. In the end, countries agreed that the
agreement would be revised every ﬁve years on the basis of results of an economic
impact study and that the generous safeguard measures for ECOWAS's 5-band
common external tariff (an external tariff up to 70% for a ﬁve year period since the
start of the implementation of the CET is scheduled for early 2015) thus giving
each country plenty of room to protect domestic industries.
4 A more accurate description of the liberalization involved should state
phases by number of years since starting with the year the ﬁnal agreement is
signed (which will be 2014 because of the October 1, 2014 deadline) and the
amounts involved should be based on 2014 data. For the EAC-EU EPA, as of
August 2014, an agreement has been reached on the MFN clause and on Rules
of Origin However, the two parties disagree on provisions for agricultural
subsidies that farmers in the EU beneﬁt from, duties and taxes on EAC exports
and non-trade issues such as good governance and transparency. On taxes on
exports, the EAC wants to maintain its authority to determine when to impose
the duties without seeking authorization from the EU. On subsidies, EAC
members insisted that there must be a provision in the EPA that limits or
excludes the EAC as a destination for EU agricultural exports beneﬁting from
subsidies. Finally, EAC has reservations about including a non-execution clause
that permits the deal's suspension in cases of proven human rights violations.
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Exports from the EAC to the EU will be largely unaffected
by the EPA since, apart from Kenya, they have DFQF access
under EBA. So estimates of the EPA on revenues and resource
allocation can be approximated by concentrating on imports by
the EAC. All official tariffs are all equal to zero within the
community and all countries have a common external tariff
(CET). The CET includes two schedules: schedule 1 with duty
rates under the three-band tax structure, i.e. rates applied for
raw materials (0%), intermediate products (10%) and finished
goods (25%), and schedule 2 with duty rates of sensitive items
(the so-called ‘SI list’ in the range of [35%;100%]). Except for
a few exemptions, the EAC's tariff vis-à-vis the EU is the CET.
Under this CET, a substantial share of imports from EU already
benefits from 0% tariffs. The EAC thus satisfies the EU's
objective of helping the integration of ACP countries by a
two-layer process of integration, the first one at the regional
level already completed.
3.1. Estimates from statutory tariffs
Table 2 gives indicators of the importance of the EU in each
EAC member and estimates of the revenue losses from imple-
menting the EPA. For the 5 countries, around 60% of their
imported products involve some imports from the EU (rows
(1) and (2)) ranging from 30.4% of imports for Burundi to 12.8%
for Uganda (row 5). Accordingly import-duty revenue from the
EU is also higher for Burundi (37.6%) and Rwanda (24.1%) than
for Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda (row 11). While the list of
excluded goods should represent 20% of imports from the EU,
since the list is the same for all EAC countries but EU trade shares
differ across countries, the share of excluded imports will be
different across countries ranging from 14.8% for Tanzania to
24.3% for Burundi (row 6).5 Using statutory tariffs and 2011
imports, the aggregate (over the 3 phases) direct revenue loss is
estimated at 40% of revenues (from the EU), ranging from 37%
for Rwanda to 50% for Tanzania (row 13). In terms of leeway for
government spending, the greatest loss would be for Tanzania as
revenues from tariffs on EU imports would be cut in half,
contributing only to 9.2% of government spending (row 10).
3.2. Estimates from customs data
The direct first-order estimates from statutory tariffs in Table 2
have the advantage of not requiring data beyond trade volumes
and official tariff schedules, but they have two drawbacks. First,
they assume no response of imports to the elimination of tariffs5 This estimate based on 2011 imports represents a large difference across
countries and will most likely be different by the time the EPA is fully
implemented. However, even though this exclusion was negotiated on the basis
of average imports over 2004–06, in 2011, excluded goods represent 19.3% of
EAC imports from the EU (not shown in Table 2). The differences in shares in
row 6 reﬂect differences of trade patterns and differences in bargaining power
across EAC members result in a much higher share of product under negotiation
in the EPA for Burundi (around 23.1%) than for example, for Kenya and
Uganda (of respectively 14.2% and 10.5%).by EACmembers on their imports from the EU. Second, they fail
to take into account exemptions from tariff duties that are
typically more important for products in the highest tariff bands
(see below). From a revenue perspective, both simplifications
distort the estimates from the EPA as import response to tariff
cuts also affects the base from which revenues from other taxes
(VAT and excise) are collected at customs.
Two approaches could remedy this shortcoming: partial
equilibrium estimates that can be carried out at the HS-6 product
levels on the basis of customs data and full economy-wide
estimates based on computable general equilibrium (CGE)
approach that takes into account secondary effects.6 The partial
equilibrium approach taken here has two advantages. First, for
welfare cost estimates, it takes fully into account the variance in
tariffs across products (for a given average tariff, the welfare costs
are higher the greater the variance across tariffs). Second for
revenue loss estimates, it lends itself to taking into account tariff
exemptions. On the other hand, CGE-based estimates have the
advantage of estimating the supply response and income
redistribution effects while taking into account economy-wide
budget and factor endowment constraints, all of which would be
important for extensive changes in trade policy. This is not the
case herewhere changes in tariffs are small as tariffs are only to be
eliminated on some imports from one partner, with the reduction
taking place for products with low tariffs. Therefore, the partial
equilibrium approach taken here is arguably more appropriate to
estimate the likely effects of the negotiated EPAs.
Table 3 compares average applied and statutory tariffs by tariff
bands based on customs data for Rwanda (2012) and Uganda
(2011) using the TRIST (for Tariff Reform Impact Simulation
Tool) simulation package (see Brenton et al., 2011).7 The applied
tariffs take account of tariff exemptions (e.g. imports of goods in
transit, imports for ministries in public agencies, international
agencies, non-profit and charity organizations—all entities exempt
from duties according to the revenue code). For both Rwanda and
Uganda the import-weighted applied tariff is much lower
(respectively 4.3% and 3.3%) than the corresponding average
statutory tariff (of respectively 7.5% and 5.9%) (Table 2, col. 8b).
As expected, the gap between applied and statutory rates is
greatest for the 25% tariff band (the simple average applied
tariff is of 17%), a well-known stylized fact for low-income
countries that is usually not taken into account during the
negotiations. Thus, exemptions are concentrated on high tariffs,
precisely those tariffs that are the cause of the greatest losses in
efficiency. Goods excluded count for between 46% (Uganda)
and 76% (Rwanda) of tariff revenues from the EU, a large
difference in spite of a common list. Large differences must
have certainly contributed to the difficulties encountered in
reaching agreement on a single list of excluded products. This
is probably an important contributing factor to why several
IEPAs were negotiated at the country (e.g. Cameroon Côte6 Fontagné et al. (2011) give estimates of completing the six EPAs. Their
results show small welfare and revenue effects.
7 Customs data for the other EAC members were not available. The
discussion paper gives a detailed explanation of how the data was prepared
for the simulations and a more detailed explanation of the results summarized
here.
Table 2
EU-EAC trade by country and revenue loss estimates from statutory tariffs.
Source: Melo and Regolo (Tables 2, 3, 4) calculations using BACI database/TRAINS trade data (2011).
Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda
(i) Number of HS6 lines with
positive imports 2011
Total (1) 1566 3880 2988 3984 3658
From EU (2) 930 2702 1462 2589 2159
Excluded lines (3) 553 1116 977 1119 1090
(ii) Imports Total ($ thousand) (4) 332,009 10,705,526 1,407,440 10,572,156 5,331,288
EU import share (5) 30.4% 18.4% 18.8% 15.8% 12.8%
Share of imports excluded from the EPA
(% of EU imports)
(6) 24.3% 22.8% 22.1% 14.8% 18.1%
Share of EPA (% of total imports) (7) 23.1% 14.2% 14.7% 13.5% 10.5%
(iii) Tariff revenue a Average applied statutory tariff b 8(a) 5.5% 9.5% 7.5% 6.8% 5.9%
Average applied collected tariff c 8(b) (4.3%) (3.3%)
Total tariff revenue (% of GDP) (9) 0.8% 3.0% 1.3% 3.0% 2.0%
Tariff revenue (% of government spending) d (10) 2.8% 18.1% 14.2% 18.4% 17.8%
From EU (% of import revenue) (11) 37.6% 14.0% 24.1% 11.8% 11.4%
(iv) Direct revenue loss from
EPA statutory tariffs
In thousand dollars (12) 2617 51,770 7358 42,566 15,585
% of initial revenue for imports from EU
(total import revenue)
(13a) 38.1% 36.5% 37.3% 50.0% 40.4%
(13b) (6864) (141,822) (19,708) (85,089) (38,604)
Revenue loss estimates take account of exceptions.
a Computed at the HS-6 level on the basis of statutory tariffs.
b Import-weighted.
c Calculated from customs data: Rwanda (2012), Uganda (2011).
d Source: WDI indicators.
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level wished by the EU.
For Rwanda and Uganda, all imported sensitive items are in
the list of excluded goods.8 The import weighted average
statutory tariffs on excluded goods were of 4.7% and of 12.8%
in Rwanda but actual weighted average collected tariff on these
goods is around 13% reflecting the common observation that
higher statutory tariffs are accompanied by a lower implemen-
tation rate so the exclusions are in effect negotiated on applied
tariff rates that could be up to half the official rates (see Table 5
of de Melo and Regolo, 2013).9
Table 4 reports the results of two EPA scenarios for imports,
tariff revenue and revenue from all border levies (i.e. tariffs, VAT
and excise taxes), the first scenario based on the exclusion list, the
second from a “full” EPA in which tariffs are removed on all EU
imports. The estimated losses of tariff revenue in the first scenario
are low, of respectively 3.3% for Rwanda and 8.1% for Uganda.
Moreover, once the positive effect of the increase in imports on
other border levies is taken into account, the total losses of tax
levies are negligible (of 0.8% for Rwanda and of 1.3% Uganda).
Even for the “full” EPA estimates (cols. 2 and 4), revenue loss8 Note that sensitive items have statutory ad valorem tariffs between 35% and
100% and some have speciﬁc tariffs (for example, tariff on worn clothing is:
“35% or USD 0.20/kg whichever is higher”). Speciﬁc tariffs affect only 2
products HS8 imported from the EU. For these products as for the other
product, TRIST computes the corresponding applied tariff using the ratio
between import revenues and CIF value.
9 Damuri (2012) reports that for 15 bilateral agreements involving the QUAD,
7% of the products in the sample involving 11,000 products are excluded either
temporarily or permanently. These exclusions are concentrated in the food and
agricultural sectors where political-economy motivations for maintaining
protection are high.estimates are low, especially when compared to the direct
estimates from statutory tariffs (Table 2, row 13b).
These estimates do not take into account that the VAT
collected on intermediate products at the borders would be
reimbursed to firms. However, since the estimated changes in
VAT revenue following the implementation of the EPA are
approximately equal to 0% (see Fig. 1 and Tables A.5.5.a and
A5.5.b in de Melo and Regolo, 2013), taking account of VAT
repayments would not affect the results of Table 4 significantly.
Actually, in Table 4, the difference between the % change in
tariff revenue and the % change in total border levies revenue is
mainly due to the low share of tariff revenues in the total border
levies revenue (of respectively 24% and 16% for Rwanda and
Uganda, see Table 4 of de Melo and Regolo, 2013).4. Efficiency estimates
Achieving greater reciprocity in EU-ACP goods trade relations
was necessary for non-LDCACP countries to maintain and secure
market access in the EU. While the exclusion list shields the two
countries from the expected loss of tariff revenue, it also results in
a smaller reduction in average tariffs which would be the source of
efficiency gains via an increase in consumer purchasing power,
provided that diversion of imports away from other potentially
more efficient partners (e.g. the rest-of-the-world and China
especially) towards the EU are not too large. Fig. 1 gives the
decomposition of the welfare effects of implementing the EPA
(based on import values of 2011 for Uganda and of 2012 for
Rwanda). Removing tariffs on all goods results not only in a larger
gain in consumers' surplus, but also in a larger revenue loss, a
reflection of the importance of excluded goods in government
revenue. In the end, however, the decomposition in Fig. 1 shows a
Table 3
Distribution of applied tariffs on trade by statutory tariff band.
Source: Authors' calculations from customs data.
Statutory and
excluded
Number of
products
CIF import value
(USD million)
Import share Share of tariff
revenue
Simple average
applied tariff b
Weighted average
applied tariff
3a: Rwanda
0% 665 161 59.4% 0.0% 0.00% 0.0%
10% 425 38 14.0% 15.7% 7.5% 4.2%
25% 297 17 6.2% 8.4% 17.1% 5.1%
Excluded a 664 56 20.5% 75.9% 20.1% 13.6%
Total 2051 271 100% 100% 10.6% 3.7%
3b: Uganda
0% 924 441 69.6% 0.0% 0.00% 0.0%
10% 523 79 12.5% 21.3% 7.2% 5.7%
25% 371 39 6.2% 32.8% 17.0% 18.0%
Excluded a 761 75 11.8% 45.9% 17.8% 13.1%
Total 2579 635 100% 100% 9.0% 3.4%
a Number of lines excluded from tariff removal. Excluded goods include all sensitive items of the CET imported by Rwanda and Uganda. Taking apart the specific
tariff, the average statutory tariffs on excluded goods are of 24.7% for Rwanda and 12.8% for Uganda.
b Average applied tariff from customs data for the corresponding tariff lines.
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the EPA currently under negotiations.10
Eliminating tariffs preferentially for imports from the EU
gives rise to two well-known effects: (i) pure trade creation, i.e.
an increase in the volume of imports from the EU, and (ii) trade
diversion as imports from other partners are replaced by imports
from the EU. However, there is “trade diversion” only if the good
imported is produced less efficiently in the EU than in countries
subject to the MFN tariff, and there is “trade correction” when
deviated imports were previously originating from countries
which already benefited from preferential access prior to the EU
being granted the tariff reduction. This is not trade diversion as it
actually reflects a move of consumption towards a more efficient
producer that was previously disadvantaged in terms of market
access. Contrary to trade diversion, trade correction is not welfare
reducing. Fig. 2 shows that the increase in imports from the EU is
largely dominated by trade creation which represents approxi-
mately 83% of the import increase, although trade diversion is
substantial (around 13%) and slightly higher under the full
liberalization.11
These estimates are at the HS8 product line level. Collapsing
these estimates to 72 ISIC sectors shows that for the “realistic”
EPA (i.e. partial rather than full tariff elimination to all partners)
the estimated price decline would exceed 1% only in 4 sectors in
Rwanda and in 12 in Uganda.12 Not surprisingly, the price10 Amounts are $191,000 and $1.287 million respectively for Rwanda and
Uganda for the EPA with exclusions and $1.440 million and $2.898 million when
there are no exclusions. These estimates assume an elasticity of substitution
between partners of 1.5, and an import price elasticity of demand of −1.0.
Doubling both elasticities would lead to small positive welfare effects in spite of a
larger revenue loss as imports from non-EU partners fall.
11 A decomposition of trade diversion by origin shows that trade is diverted
mostly from China and from the rest-of-the-world rather than from COMESA
partners (see de Melo and Regolo, 2013, Fig. 3).
12 The price to pay for product-line estimates is that inter-industry linkages are
not taken into account. Since the estimates suggest that intermediates or semi-
processed are the most affected products, a fall in their price will raise the value-
added price, and hence the proﬁtability, of downstream sectors.decreases are concentrated in activities producing intermediate
products rather than final products which are produced locally
and for which lobbying activities would have opposed tariff
reductions. This also means that the EPA will have more impact
on local firms' costs (e.g. lower cost of electricity) than on the
purchasing power of households where a large share of
household expenditures is dedicated to food.
How plausible are these estimates suggesting few changes from
a status quo? Do they vastly under-estimate the likely gains from
the contemplated EPA? On the positive side suggesting greater
gains is the recognition that these are static first-order (i.e. do not
take into account supply response) estimates that do not take into
account several factors that would contribute towards resulting in
an overall positive effect. To start with, the estimated increase in
imports is at the intensive margin since new products—another
source of welfare gain—this time at the extensive margin, are not
accounted for. Other well-known positive effects of liberalization
for which there is increasing empirical support are not taken into
account either (e.g. Goldberg et al., 2009). The first is the pro-
competitive effect of greater competition as imports remove
market power for incumbent domestic firms. Lower price–cost
margins raise welfare. The second effect is increased efficiency as
low-productivity firms exit the market. The third is increased scale
efficiency as incumbent firms move down their cost curves.
More and better suited varieties are to be expected from the
implementation of a full EPA as European products are close to the
frontier in terms of costs and quality.13 However, if one recognizes
that the reductions in tariffs are for one partner, are small and only
for products with relatively low tariffs, these other positive effects
would only be significant for a ‘full’ EPA with no exclusions.13 An order of magnitude is provided by Goldberg et al. (2009) estimates for
India's trade liberalization which show that 65% of the increase in Indian imports
following trade liberalization was for new HS products with 82% coming from
new varieties, the new varieties being concentrated on intermediate inputs with
70% coming fromOECD countries. They estimate that the new varieties generated
an additional 4.7% decline in the imported input price index and that ﬁrms
developed new products.
Table 4
Revenue estimates of full EPA with and without exclusion lists.
Source: Melo and Regolo (Table 5) from customs data: 2011 for Uganda, 2012 for Rwanda.
Rwanda Uganda
EPA with official
EAC exclusion list
(1)
EPA with no sensitive product
list (100% liberalized)
(2)
EPA with official
EAC exclusion list
(3)
EPA with no sensitive product
list (100% liberalized)
(4)
% change in imports 0.1% 0.5% 0.2% 0.4%
% change in tariff revenue −3.2% −13.2% −8.1% −15.0%
% change in total border levies revenue
(VAT, excise taxes and tariffs)
−0.8% −3.3% −1.3% −2.5%
% change in collected applied tariff rate −3.3% −13.6% −8.29% −15.39%
Note: Figures reported here are results for total imports; total tariff revenue and total tax revenue from all partners (including the EU).
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understate the likely gains is the assumption of a full utilization of
preferences. While rates of preference utilization are on the rise
world-wide (see WTO, 2011; Keck and Lendle, 2012 for
developing countries in developed countries), rules of origin
(RoO) that are necessary to prevent trade deflection may
represent an important obstacle to realizing these gains. Indeed,
in all PTA negotiations since NAFTA, RoO have been the subject
of intense negotiations largely driven by private-sector interests.
Of interest to EAC producers in the EPA negotiations are the
apparel and fish sectors where EU MFN rates are over 10%,
implying substantial potential market access if RoO are not too
strict. As mentioned above, simpler rules for both sectors have
already been obtained as part of the IEPA negotiations.14
Of interest to EPA consumers is that the RoO that are necessary
to prevent trade-deflection should be kept simple, i.e. they should
be ‘business-friendly’ rather than ‘business-owned’ since, in the
end, the objective of grantingmarket-access is to favor the partner.
The final stages of the EU-EAC negotiations show that 372
products are under negotiation for Product-Specific Rules of
Origin (PSRO) and while the EU-EAC protocol (July 2013) is 78
pages long, the corresponding list of proposed RoO has 180
pages! PSRO are tougher for the EU for 70 products and only for 4
products for the EAC and there is only disagreement for 5
products (see de Melo and Regolo, 2013, Table 8). One way to
interpret this pattern is to conclude that the EAC has potentially
obtained extra protection from these more stringent rules for 70
products. From an efficiency point of view, however, it is possible
that RoO for imports from the EUwill be sufficiently restrictive as
to significantly reduce the import response and efficiency gains
below the levels estimated in this paper.14 de Melo and Portugal-Perez (2014) estimate that the move by the US under
AGOA to abandon the ‘triple transformation rule’ (cotton → yarn → textile →
apparel) to a ‘single-transformation’ rule (the so-called “special rule”)
conferring duty-free access to apparel regardless of the origin of fabric
increased apparel exports to the US by about 168% for the top 7 (out of 22)
qualifying African exporters in the AGOA group. For the EU, the
corresponding product-speciﬁc RoO required that apparel also be manufactured
from qualifying yarn (i.e. yarn originating in the country or in the EU) following
a double transformation process (yarn → textile → apparel) in the beneﬁciary
country. The EU's decision to move to the single-transformation rule when it
revised its rules of origin in 2010 is a welcome move in the direction of
simplifying RoO.5. A more ambitious agenda would have addressed
simplifying rules of origin and deepening integration by
opening services sectors
The estimates in this paper are narrowly-based, only taking
into account the response of imports to the reductions in tariffs
that will take place when a full EPA is implemented. The small
magnitude of the estimates on revenue and welfare are
attributable to the already relatively low tariffs embodied in
the EAC's CET and the relatively small share of EU imports.
However, in the long-run, other efficiency-raising effects under
a more ambitious agenda are likely to occur. Estimating these is
beyond the scope of this paper although a range of orders of
magnitude from other studies is mentioned below, notably
relating to rules of origin and to the deepening of integration to
include services, which would have secured larger gains from
the negotiations.
On RoO, the extensive evidence on their cost-raising effects
suggests that the way ahead is not to haggle over the particular
content of PSRO as in the ongoing EAC-EPA negotiations, but
to make them simpler.15 For example, in their highly trade
promoting FTAs, Asian FTAs have usually avoided PSRO with
two broad categories: wholly obtained for agricultural products
and a single threshold of non-originating materials of less than
60% of the FOB price (Cadot et al., 2007). This much simpler
rule has served well ‘factory Asia’. The negotiations should
have also pushed for making RoO more compatible with the
multilateral trading system as proposed by Estevadeordal et al.
(2009). Multilateralizing RoO would imply adopting rules that
would ensure that at least the qualifying production methods in
a given sector would remain relatively similar across export
markets.16
As to services, the African paradigm for regional integration
continues to be one of linear integration, following stepwise
integration of goods, labor and capital markets, and eventually
monetary and fiscal integration. This has been the route
followed by the EAC, the most advanced Regional Integration15 Cadot and de Melo (2007) and WTO (2011) survey the estimates of the
costs of rules of origin.
16 WTO (2011, box E2) elaborates on rules that could be negotiated at the
WTO. Convergence in rules would be helped by capping cumulation zones as
the restrictiveness of the current RoO across RTAs are positively correlated
with the cumulation zone.
Fig. 1. Welfare estimates of EPA on Rwanda and Uganda. Source: Melo and Regolo, Fig. 1. Values are percent of total initial imports. From front to back: Total
welfare effect, other tax revenue, tariff revenue and consumer surplus.
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common market in 2010 with the next planned step being a
monetary union for 2015. In this linear integration model trade
in services only gets attention when the common market stage
is reached.
This focus on goods markets, or ‘shallow’ integration also
applies to the EPA negotiations where there is reluctance to
liberalize the services market. It is ironic that trade in services
has been largely missing in EAC's regional integration agenda,
at least until recently, since in a world where the production
chain is increasingly delocalised, a well-functioning regulatoryig. 2. Estimated changes in EU imports, trade creation and trade diversion. Source: Melo and Regolo (Fig. 2). Note: Trade creation is the share of increase of imports
om EU which has not been diverted from other partners; Trade diversion is the share of increase of imports from EU which was previously imported from other
artners with an applied tariff higher or equal to the previous applied tariffs from EU; trade correction is the share of increase of imports from EU which wasF
fr
p
previously imported from partners who were benefitting from preferential applied taenvironment and a relatively open services sector is required to
attract the FDI. And FDI are needed to provide the backbone
services to compete in goods markets.
While caution is called for when opening services sectors,
estimates of gains from a successful opening of the services
sector are likely to be large relative to the gains from removing
remaining tariffs. Gravity-based simulations of trade costs for
services (mode 1 and 2) for industrialized countries over the
period 1995–2007 by Miroudot et al. (2013) suggest that trade
costs in services are about two to three times higher than trade
costs in goods and that, contrary to trade costs in goods, theyriffs compared to the EU.
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not been reduced even in the EU where heterogeneity in trade
costs remain high. Similar results are likely to hold for
developing and low-income countries, suggesting large gains
to be reaped from reforming the regulatory environment even
though liberalization requires technical capacity.17
As an example of orders of magnitude of potential gains from
liberalization of services sectors, in a series of papers using
simulation methods similar to TRIST but in full general
equilibrium models of the economy, Tarr and co-authors have
estimated the ex-ante welfare effects of liberalization of services
sectors in Tanzania and in Kenya, two EAC members. In their
model, goods-producing sectors are protected by tariffs, as are
services sectors where in some cases, services by foreigners are not
provided under protection because the market is closed. Opening
the market attracts FDI which in turn lowers the cost of producing
goods because a greater number of varieties of intermediate goods
become available and the cost of services fall. In their simulations,
the gains from reducing barriers in services trade are a multiple of
the gains from eliminating protection. Furthermore, their simula-
tions show that there are complementarities between reductions in
barriers to trade in services and in goods as lower barriers to
services trade reduce the costs for goods production.
In the case of Tanzania, Tarr and Rutherford (2010) estimate
that gains from service reform could reach 5% of consumption
(4.5% of GDP) in the medium term. They also find that
productivity gains from the net introduction of new varieties of
service providers and from additional varieties of goods could
raise the gain from services reform to 14.1% of GDP in the long
term mostly from regulatory reforms for water and road transport,
and for the banking sectors. In the case of Kenya, Balistreri and
Tarr (2011) contrast the results from an opening of services sectors
unilaterally to all partners on a non-discriminatory basis, regionally
with African partners, and also with the EU as would be the case
under the EPAs. They find that the preferential arrangement with
the EU that includes both goods and services would generate gains
for Kenya of 0.5% of consumption, gains coming primarily from
the preferential liberalization of services (0.3%), rather than from
liberalization of goods. This gain is three times larger than the
effect if the preferential liberalization of services were with the
Africa region (of 0.1%). They also estimate that wider liberaliza-
tion, with more partners, i.e. multilaterally, would yield much
larger gains due to providing access to a muchwider set of services
providers.
Like the ones in this paper, these simulations are ex-ante,
requiring caution in interpretation even though the mechanisms17 Liberalization of services sectors is difﬁcult to implement. As discussed in
Brenton et al. (2010), it requires considerably technical capacity and there is the
risk that the gains from greater competition by giving market to foreigners will
run against the social objective of providing services to the poor as the
foreigners eschew servicing them because they are the least proﬁtable to serve.
Regulatory reform should also accompany trade liberalization. Pitfalls in
harmonizing standards to EU (or Northern norms in general) should be clearly
weighed to avoid premature harmonization to Northern standards (Disdier et al.,
forthcoming) or errors like those in the harmonization of milk standards (Jensen
and Keyser, 2012).included in the models have strong empirical grounding across
a spectrum of environments. It is likely to be detrimental to the
EAC to rely solely on the standard mercantilist approach of
exchange of market access for goods. It will not work as there is
no new market access for the EAC in the EU. In the EU, sectors
such as finance, telecommunications and information technol-
ogy are already open to all service suppliers, including those
from Africa. On the other hand, the EU is very restrictive and
not prepared to make offers in the area of greatest potential
benefit for Africa — the temporary movement of unskilled
workers.6. Conclusions
Achieving greater reciprocity in EU-ACP relations for goods
trade was necessary for non-LDC ACP countries to maintain and
secure market access in the EU market. Originally, the CPA was
to help promote deeper integration within the groupings and to
extend negotiations to cover trade in services, now the backbone
for competitiveness in goods markets for countries wishing to
participate in regional production networks. Only the CA-EU
EPA achieved this objective, though with limited success at
implementation so far. The others concentrated their negotiations
efforts on goods trade. The focus was on drawing exception lists
to minimize losses in government revenues, the inclusion or not
of an MFN clause and detailing product-specific rules of origin.
This paper estimates the effects of the EAC-EU EPA, an
interesting case since EAC is the most integrated regional
grouping in Africa with a reasonably functioning Customs
Union since 2005 (and a common market since 2010), much
along the two-layer regional objective set out by the EU at the
launch of the CPA. Revenue losses and welfare estimates are
carried out at the HS-6 product level. For Rwanda and Uganda,
estimates from customs data suggest that revenue losses will be
half of those drawn from statutory tariffs. Based on customs
data, under the negotiated exception list, government revenues
would decline by 0.8% for Rwanda and 1.3% for Uganda while
a more ambitious full liberalization (no exceptions) would still
only result in losses of 3.3% and 2.5%, respectively. Impacts on
welfare and on efficiency are also estimated to be negligible. As
they were negotiated along the same lines, similarly small
revenue and efficiency estimates would emerge from estimates
of the other EPA negotiations.
The experience of the EAC and the results of this paper suggest
that the negotiations which have focused on a ‘shallow’ exchange
of market access in goods markets will have negligible effects.
Negotiations should have rather focussed on providing the aid-
for-trade resources to provide the knowledge platforms and
technical assistance learned from other experiences with integra-
tion in services sectors, in order to ensure that the appropriate
supportive regulatory framework in the EAC is adopted sector by
sector. The Trade Facilitation Agreement signed in Bali in
December 2013, if it is to be implemented, would provide the
necessary framework and resources for technical support to reduce
trade costs, thereby contributing to Africa's integration into the
World Trading System.
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